Abstract-We consider the framework of aggregative games with affine coupling constraints, where agents have partial information of the aggregate value and can only obtain information from neighbouring agents. We propose a single-layer distributed algorithm that reaches a variational generalized Nash equilibrium, under constant step sizes. The algorithm works on a single timescale, i.e., does not require multiple communication rounds between agents before updating their action. The convergence proof leverages an invariance property of the aggregate estimates and relies on a forward-backward splitting for two preconditioned operators and their restricted (strong) monotonicity properties on the consensus subspace.
(GNE), or to an aggregative (Wardrop) equilibrium (GAE), the latter being an -GNE, with tending to zero as the number of agent goes to infinity, [18] . The algorithms require a central coordinator to broadcast the aggregate value and to ensure the coupling constraints are met.
In a distributed setting a central coordinator/node does not exist, and distributed algorithms are more difficult to develop. Such distributed algorithms have been mostly developed for NE seeking, i.e., for games with no coupled constraints. The first work to propose distributed NE algorithms for aggregative games over networks was [14] , [20] . In order to cope with not knowing the aggregate value, each agent maintains an estimate of the true aggregate, built based on local communication with neighbours, and uses it in the action update instead of the true aggregate. The algorithm proposed in [20] requires diminishing step-sizes for exact convergence, while only guaranteeing convergence to a neighbourhood of the NE for fixed step-sizes, under (strict) strong monotonicity of the pseudogradient of the game. The recent algorithm proposed in [21] requires an increasing number of communication rounds before each action update. In both cases, the NE seeking algorithms effectively operate as if on two timescales (fast aggregate estimate, slow action update) and each agent is using an aggregate estimate that is near the true aggregate.
Even fewer results exist for distributed GNE seeking in aggregative games with coupled constraints. In fact, the only such distributed discrete-time algorithm that we are aware of is the one proposed in [22] . The algorithm requires that players exchange information for a fixed number of communication rounds before every action update (thus is also essentially a two time-scale/twolayer algorithm) and is only guaranteed to reach an -GNE. The -GNE approaches a variational GNE only if the fixed number of communication rounds between action update goes to infinity, which is impractical. We note that a continuous-time dynamics for aggregative games with equality coupling constraints only is proposed in [23] , with gains proportional to the number of agents. However, in general convergence in continuous-time does not guarantee convergence in discrete-time.
Contributions: Motivated by the above, in this paper we propose a distributed, single-layer discrete-time GNE seeking algorithm for aggregative games with affine coupling constraints, that has guaranteed exact convergence a variational GNE when using constant stepsizes. To the best of our knowledge, to date there does not exist such an algorithm. Each agent maintains an estimate of the aggregate and multiplier, and exchanges them with its neighbours over an undirected static connected graph, in order to learn the true aggregate value and ensure that the coupling constraints are satisfied. Each agent updates its action and its aggregate estimates in the same iteration. Compared to the distributed NE algorithm in [20] , and the GNE algorithm in [22] , our algorithm does not require diminishing step-sizes nor multiple communication rounds between each action update. The algorithm is related to a preconditioned forwardbackward operator splitting iteration, inspired by the distributed framework for GNE seeking in general games conceptualized in [24] , [25] for full-decision information, and extended in [26] to partial-decision information. However, we note that the algorithms in [24] , [25] , [26] are developed for generally coupled games, and are not scalable nor efficient if applied to aggregative games. In [24] , [25] while agents estimate dual multipliers distributively, each agent is assumed to know the actions of all players that affect its cost. Hence, when applied to an aggregative game the algorithm is not distributed, since it requires communication with all other agents. The algorithm in [26] relaxes this assumption to partial-decision information and, to cope with the lack of global information, each agent is required to keep an estimate of all other agents' actions (as needed due to the generality of the cost). This is not scalable for an aggregative game and moreover, not actually needed since only the estimate of the aggregate is necessary. Thus, while the algorithm in [26] is distributed (unlike [24] ), it is computationally and memory-wise inefficient if applied to an aggregative game.
The distributed algorithm we develop here bypasses these disadvantages; it is tailored for aggregative games and exploits the aggregative coupling structure in the cost. Each agent exchanges and maintains only an estimate of the aggregate (dimensionally independent on the number of agents, hence scalable) and an estimate of the dual multiplier. Thus players do not need to share action information, which might be private information. While we use proof techniques similar to those in [26] , there are substantial differences. The algorithm is different (the aggregate estimate update has an additional correction term) which technically requires that we use different splitting operators. To show the required (restricted) monotonicity/cocoercivity properties for these operators we cannot apply results in [26] , but rather we do it taking into account their specific structure. Herein we take advantage of the aggregative coupling structure and, unlike [26] , we treat separately the actions and the aggregate estimates. Furthermore, we specifically exploit invariance properties on the aggregate consensus subspace. A short version of this work is submitted [27] ; compared to the short version, this paper contains detailed proofs omitted from the conference version and additional numerical results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives preliminary background. Section III formulates the aggregative game. Section IV introduces the distributed GNE seeking algorithm for the aggregative game and relates it to a forward-backward operatorsplitting iteration. The convergence analysis is presented in Section V. Numerical results are provided in Section VI as well as comparison to the algorithm in [22] . Concluding remarks are given in Section VII.
Notations. For a vector x ∈ R m , x T denotes its transpose and x =
x | x = √ x T x the norm induced by inner product · | · . For a symmetric positive-definite matrix Φ, Φ 0, λmin(Φ) and λmax(Φ) denote its minimum and maximum eigenvalues. The Φ-induced inner product is x | y Φ = Φx | y and the Φ-induced norm, x Φ = Φx | x . For a matrix A ∈ R m×n , let A = σmax(A) denote the 2-induced matrix norm, where σmax(A) is its maximum singular value. For N = {1, . . . , N }, col(xi)i∈N denotes the stacked vector obtained from vectors xi. Similarly, diag(xi)i∈N is the diagonal matrix, with element xi along the diagonal. N ull(A) and Range(A) are the null and range space of matrix A, respectively, while [A]ij stands for its (i, j) entry. I, 1 and 0 denotes the identity matrix, ones vector and zeros vector of appropriate dimensions. Denote
II. BACKGROUND

Monotone Operators
The following are from [28] . Let A : R m → 2 R m be a set-valued operator. The domain of A is domA = {x ∈ R m | Ax = ∅} where ∅ is the empty set, and the range of A is ranA = {y ∈ R m | ∃x, y ∈ Ax}. The graph of
It is maximally monotone if graA is not strictly contained in the graph of any other monotone operator. The resolvent of A is JA = (Id + A) −1 , where Id is the identity operator. The fixed points of the operator A are
, where A(α) denotes the class of α-averaged operators, if and only if ∀x, y ∈ Ω, T x − T y
) is it also called firmly nonexpansive. If A is maximally monotone then JA = (Id + A) 
Graph Theory
Let graph G = (N , E) describe the information exchange among a set N of agents, where E ⊂ N × N is the edge set. If agent i can get information from agent j, then (j, i) ∈ E and agent j belongs to agent i's neighbour set Ni = {j | (j, i) ∈ E}. G is undirected when (i, j) ∈ E if and only if (j, i) ∈ E. G is connected if there is a path between any two nodes. Let W = [wij] ∈ R N ×N be the weighted adjacency matrix, with wij > 0 if j ∈ Ni and wij = 0 otherwise.
III. GAME FORMULATION
Consider a group of agents (players) N = {1, . . . , N }, where each player i ∈ N controls its local decision (action/strategy) xi ∈ R n . Denote x = col(xi)i∈N ∈ R N n as the decision profile. Equivalently we can also write x = (xi, x−i) where x−i = col(. . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . ) denotes the decision profile of all other agents, except player i. Agent i aims to optimize its objective functionJi(xi, x−i) (coupled to other players' decisions) with respect to its own decision xi over its feasible decision set Ωi. Let the globally shared, affine coupled constrained set be
where Ωi ⊂ R n is a private feasible set of player i, and Ai ∈ R m×n , bi ∈ R m is local player information. Let the overall feasible action space be Ω =
We focus on average aggregative games where the cost function Ji(xi, x−i) of each agent i depends on the average of all agents' actions σ(x) = 1 N N j=1 xj ∈ R n , denoted asJi(xi, x−i) = Ji(xi, σ(x)) to explictly indicate this dependency. In the remainder of the paper we use eitherJi or Ji, depending on the context. Given the other's actions x−i, the objective of each player i is to solve the following optimization problem with coupled constraints,
A generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the game is a profile
For each player i, given any x−i,Ji(xi, x−i) is continuously differentiable and convex in xi and Ωi is a compact convex set. The constraint set K is non-empty and satisfies Slater's constraint qualification. Assumption 1 is a standard assumption which ensures existence of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE).
Given the optimization problem (1) over K for each agent i, let its Lagrangian be defined as Li(xi, λi;
bi and the dual multiplier is λi ∈ R m + . Then, the KKT conditions that an optimal solution x * i with λ * i satisfies can be written as
where for an aggregative game,
, with
and where NΩ i is the normal cone operator. By Theorem 8, §4 in [12] when (col(x * i )i∈N , col(λ * i )i∈N ) satisfies (2) for all i ∈ N then x * is a GNE of the game. Given x * as a GNE of game, the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers may be different for the players, i.e., λ * 1 = λ * 2 =, ..., = λ * N . A GNE with the same Lagrangian multiplier for all agents is called variational GNE, [12] , which has the economic interpretation of no price discrimination and better stability/sensitivity properties, [29] . A variational GNE of the game is defined as x * ∈ K solution of the variational inequality V I(F, K):
where F denotes the pseudo-gradient of the game defined as
)i∈N , i.e., the stacked vector with the partial gradients for all i ∈ N . x * solves V I(F, K) if and only if there exists a λ * ∈ R m such that the KKT conditions are satisfied, [13,
or, component-wise, for any i ∈ N
where (2) with
Given this aggregative game, our aim is to design a distributed iterative algorithm that finds a variational GNE under partialdecision information over a network.
Assumption 2: F is strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous, i.e., there exist µ > 0 and lF > 0 such that for any x and x,
Assumption 2 is commonly used in algorithms with fixed-step sizes, [20] , [30] , [31] , [21] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [24] , [22] , [26] , and guarantees that a unique variational GNE exists, [13] . We consider that each agent i does not have information on the other agents actions x−i or on the aggregate value, σ(x), and that agents communicate only locally with neighbouring agents, over a communication graph G.
Assumption 3: The communication graph G = (N , E) is undirected and connected.
IV. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
In this section we present our proposed algorithm. To offset the lack of full information, each agent i maintains a local estimate ui of the aggregate σ(x) and a local multiplier λi, and exchanges them with its neighbours over G, in order to learn the true aggregate value and the Lagrange multiplier λ * . Each agent also maintains an additional auxiliary variable zi, used for the coordination of the coupling constraints and to reach consensus of the local multipliers.
Let (x i,k , u i,k , z i,k , λ i,k ) denote the tuple with agent i's decision variable x i,k , local aggregate estimate u i,k , local multiplier λ i,k , and auxiliary variable z i,k at iteration k, respectively. The goal is that over time each agent will have the same aggregate estimate, equal to the average of the agents actions, the same multiplier, and its decision will correspond to a variational GNE with the coupled constraints met. The proposed distributed algorithm is given below. Algorithm 1:
where xi,0 ∈ Ωi, ui,0 = xi,0, zi,0, λi,0 ∈ R m , ∀i ∈ N and τi, υi, αi, κ ∈ R++ are positive step sizes. Note that Algorithm 1 is fully distributed and instead of σ(x), each agent is using ui (own estimate of the aggregate) to evaluate ∇x i Ji(xi, ui) = ∇x i Ji(xi, y)|y=u i + 1 N ∇yJi(xi, y)|y=u i , its own partial gradient. To write the algorithm more compactly, let ui) )i∈N where ui ∈ R n and u = col(ui)i∈N be the extended pseudo-gradient. Note that when all
Thus, if in F (x) each agent is evaluating the gradient with the true action aggregate value, in F(x, u) each agent is using its own estimate of the aggregate, ui instead. With these we can write Algorithm 1 compactly as,
where
and L is the Laplacian matrix of the graph G, Λ = diag(Ai)i∈N , b = col(bi)i∈N , τ = diag(τi)i∈N , υ = diag(υi)i∈N , and α = diag(αi)i∈N .
Remark 1: The update for x k is a projected-gradient descent of the local Lagrangian function using player's aggregate estimate u k to evaluate the pseudo-gradient. The update for u k has a consensus term with an additional term to keep track of changes in the actions. The auxiliary variable z k is updated by a discrete-time integration for the multiplier consensual error. Lastly, the update for λ k is a combination of a projected-gradient ascent of the local Lagrangian and a proportional-integral term for the multiplier consensus error.
We first prove an important invariance property of Algorithm 1, namely that σ(
(ii) Any limit point (x, u, z, λ) of Algorithm 1 is such ui = σ(x), λi = λ * for all i ∈ N , where x = x * and λ * satisfy (3), and x * is a variational GNE.
Proof: See Appendix. Exploiting the invariance in Lemma 1(i), from (4), we next construct an auxiliary iteration with respect to the consensus subspace of the aggregate estimates, which will prove instrumental for the convergence analysis. Let C denote the n-dimensional consensus subspace for all agents' aggregate estimates, i.e., C = {u | u = 1N ⊗ c, c ∈ R n } and let C ⊥ be its orthogonal complement. Note that C = N ull(Lu) = Range(1N ⊗ In) and C ⊥ = Range(Lu) = N ull(1 T N ⊗ In). Any u ∈ R N n can be decomposed as u = P || u + P ⊥ u, where P || u ∈ C and P ⊥ u ∈ C ⊥ , by using the projection matrices
Any u k generated by (4) can be decomposed as u k = P || u k + P ⊥ u k where, by using the invariance property in Lemma 1(i),
Using this decomposition together with (4), consider:
+ . The next result relates precisely iterates generated by Algorithm 1 or (4) to iterates generated by (6) .
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 1 and 1 hold. Then, any sequence {x k , u k , z k , λ k } generated by Algorithm 1 or (4) with initial conditions x0, u0 = x0, z0, λ0 can be derived from some sequence {x k , u ⊥ k , z k , λ k } generated by (6) with initial conditions
The proof follows an induction argument. Due to the initial conditions, P || x 0 +u ⊥ 0 = P || x0+P ⊥ x0 = x0 = u0, hence (7) holds for k = 0. 6)) with z k = z k , λ k = λ k , it follows that z k+1 = z k + υL λ λ k hence by the z-update in (4), z k+1 = z k+1 . Next, using (7) into the right-hand side of the x -update in (6), yields cf. (4),
Suppose
Hence the first and third relations in (7) hold at step k + 1, and using them on the right-hand side of the λ -update in (6) yields λ k+1 = λ k+1 , where λ k+1 is generated by (4) . Lastly, we show the second relation in (7) at step k+1. Thus,
where we used relations for x at step k + 1 cf. (8) and for u ⊥ at step k cf. (7). Using (4), and the argument is complete.
Lemma 2 is instrumental in what follows. Based on it, convergence of Algorithm 1 or (4) can be established once convergence of (6) is shown. Note that any u ⊥ k generated by (6) is such that u ⊥ k ∈ C ⊥ , for all k ≥ 0. We show next that (6) can be written as a preconditioned forward-backward iteration,
+ , for two operators A and B and matrix Φ defined as,
Lemma 3: Suppose that Assumption 1,2 and 3 hold and let k = col(x k , u ⊥ k , z k , λ k ), A, B and Φ be defined as in (10) . Suppose that Φ 0 and Φ −1 B is maximally monotone. Then the following hold: (i): Iterates (6) are equivalently written as (9), i.e.,
where T2 = (Id + Φ −1 B) −1 and T1 = Id − Φ −1 A. (ii) Any limit point of (6) is a zero of A+B and a fixed point of T2 •T1. Furthermore, any such point¯ = col(x,ū ⊥ ,z,λ) satisfies x = x * ,ū ⊥ = 0,λ = 1N⊗λ * , where x * and λ * satisfy the KKT conditions (3), hence x * is a variational GNE. Proof: (i) The equivalence between (9) and (6) can be shown by expanding (9) with A, B and Φ as in (10), cancelling terms and using τ −1 NΩ(x) = NΩ(x), PΩ = (Id + NΩ) −1 . Since Φ 0 by assumption, (9) is equivalent to ⊥ ,z,λ) be limit point of (6) or (9), hence is a fixed point of T2 •T1. By continuity, the following equivalences hold,¯ = (Id+Φ
Thus, using (10), it follows that¯ = col(x,ū ⊥ ,z,λ) satisfies:
By Assumption 3, the second and third relations imply thatū
Using these in the first and fourth relations together with P ||x = σ(x), leads to 0 ∈ NΩ(x) + F(x, 1N ⊗ σ(x)) + A T λ * which, using
as in the proof of Lemma 1(ii), the second condition in (3) holds hencex = x * is a variational GNE. Remark 2: Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 show that Algorithm 1 is related to a forward-backward iteration (9) or (11), [28] , with a preconditioning matrix Φ. Note that A and B (10) each have a skew-symmetric part (monotone) and Φ is symmetric. The matrix Φ is needed, as pointed out in [24] and [26] , to be able to distribute the backward step. Our proof techniques are similar to those in [26] , however, there are significant differences. One of the reasons is that in the general setup in [26] the action is part of the estimate vector, while in our setup the actions and the aggregate estimate are separate and only consensus on the aggregate is needed. Due to this difference, the splitting in (10) is different than that used in [26] . The operators A and B as well as the metric matrix Φ have a different structure, with a new (skew-symmetric) block involving the projection matrix P ⊥ which needs handled separately.
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section we show convergence of Algorithm 1. Based on Lemma 2 its convergence can be established once convergence of (6) is shown. In turn, (6) is equivalent to (9) or (11), (cf. Lemma 3). Convergence of iteration (11) is guaranteed when Φ −1 A is a cocoercive and Φ −1 B is a monotone operator, cf. Theorem 25.8 in [28] . However, A is defined in terms of the extended pseudogradient F for which monotonicity properties are not guaranteed to hold on the augmented space of actions and aggregate estimates (only strong monotonicity of F (x) is assumed). Instead, we will show that A satisfies a restrictive cocoercive property and that B is maximally monotone, and then similar properties for Φ −1 A and Φ −1 B. This turns out to be sufficient to prove convergence because the restrictive property is with respect to the aggregate consensus subspace where the zeros of A + B lie, cf. Lemma 3(ii). To show the restrictive cocoercive property of A we balance the strong monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient F (x) (on the aggregate consensus subspace C) with that of the Laplacian on its orthogonal component C ⊥ , under a Lipschitz assumption on the extended pseudo-gradient F(x, u).
Assumption 4: The extended pseudo-gradient F(x,u) is Lipschitz continuous in both arguments, i.e., ∃l
∀x, x, u ∈ R N n . Assumption 4 is also used in other distributed (G)NE algorithms, [20] , [31] , [22] .
The following lemma establishes a (restricted) monotonicity property on part of the A operator, (10), denotedÃ.
Lemma 4: LetÃ be defined as,
where (x, u ⊥ ) ∈ R N n ×C ⊥ . Suppose that Assumption 1,2,3 and 4 hold. Then, for any (x, u ⊥ ) and any (x, u ⊥ ) with u ⊥ = 0,
.
and strongly monotone if the inequality is strict. Proof: WithÃ as in (12), for any (x,u ⊥ ), (x, u ⊥ ) with u ⊥ = 0, the left-hand side of (13) is written as
Note that x−x F(x,P || x)−F(x,P || x) ≥ µ x−x 2 , by F(x,P || x) = F(x,1N ⊗ σ(x)) = F (x) and Assumption 2. Also,
by Assumption 3. Using these inequalities into (14) yields
Remark 3: Lemma 4 shows thatÃ is monotone when it is restricted to a subspace where u ⊥ = 0. This means when u = u || ∈ C, i.e., the restrictive monotonicity property is with respect to the n-dimensional aggregate consensus subspace (independent of N ). This is unlike [26] where the restricted monotonicity is with respect to the N n-dimensional consensus subspace (cf. Lemma 3 in [26] ). In fact, the bound in (13) is tighter than the one in Lemma 3 in [26] (or Theorem 5 in [32] ) and does not depend on N the number of agents.
Using the fact thatÃ is restricted monotone we can now show properties for the operators A and B, (10).
Lemma 5: Suppose Assumption 1,2,3 and 4 hold and λ2(L) >
. Then the following hold for operators A and B, (10). (i) B is maximally monotone.
(ii) A is β-restricted cocoercive: for any = (x, u ⊥ , z, λ) with u ⊥ ∈ C ⊥ and any = (x, u ⊥ , z, λ) with u ⊥ = 0, the following holds
where β= min{
* is the maximal degree of the graph G. Proof: (i): B is written as the sum of two operators, one being a Cartesian product of normal cone operators, hence maximally monotone operator, and the other one being a skew-symmetric matrix, hence also maximally monotone, with full domain. Thus B itself is maximally monotone, [28] .
(ii): With = (x, u ⊥ , z, λ), = (x, u ⊥ , z, λ) andÃ as in (12) we can write for A (10),
The second term is 0 since the matrix is skew-symmetric, and for the third term,
is the maximum degree of graph G. Using this with (13) in Lemma 4, from (15) it follows that for any u ⊥ ∈ C ⊥ , u ⊥ = 0,
On the other hand, usingÃ as in (12), Lipschitz properties of F, bounds on the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix L and the projection matrix P ⊥ , we obtain the following Lipschitz property
which, with A as in (10), can be written as
The following lemma shows how agents can select step-sizes independently such that Φ 0. It can be easily proved based on the Schur complement and a diagonal dominance argument (Ghershgorin's theorem).
Lemma 6: Given any δ > 0 and κ < 1 δ
, if steps-sizes are selected such that where β is from Lemma 5 and step sizes τi, κ, υi and αi chosen to satisfy Lemma 6. Then under the Φ-induced norm · Φ the following hold:
B is maximally monotone and T2 = (I +Φ
A is βδ-restricted cocoercive and T1 = Id − Φ −1 A is restricted nonexpansive and furthermore, the following holds for any = (x, u ⊥ , z, λ) and any = (x, 0, z, λ), T1 −T1 ). (ii:) For Φ −1 A, note that by Lemma 5(ii), for any = (x, u ⊥ , z, λ) and any
By Lemma 6, Φ − δI is positive semi-definite, hence λmax(Φ) ≥ λmin(Φ) ≥ δ and λmax(Φ
Therefore, combining the foregoing two inequalities yields
and hence Φ −1 A is βδ-restricted cocoercive under the Φ-induced norm. For the operator T1 = Id−Φ −1 A, for any = (x, u ⊥ , z, λ) and any = (x, u ⊥ , z, λ) with u ⊥ = 0, the following hold
where the inequality follows since Φ −1 A is βδ-restricted cocoercive. Since by assumption 2βδ > 1, this implies that
After establishing these properties on operators A and B, we show next convergence to the variational GNE. where β is as in Lemma 5 and step sizes τi, κ, υi and αi chosen to satisfy Lemma 6. Then the action x i,k of each player i ∈ N generated by Algorithm 1 converges to the corresponding component in the GNE x * , all agents' aggregate estimates u i,k converge to the same value σ(x * ) (true aggregate) for all i ∈ N , all agent's local multipliers λ i,k converge to the same multiplier λ * for all i ∈ N , corresponding to the KKT condition (3) .
Proof: Lemma 2 shows that any sequence {x k , u k , z k , λ k } generated by Algorithm 1 or (4) can be obtained by some sequence
. Thus, if we show that any sequence {x k , u ⊥ k , z k , λ k } of (6) converges to (x,ū ⊥ ,z,λ), then convergence of any sequence {x k , u k , z k , λ k } of Algorithm 1 follows, and moreover, by (7), its limit is (x,P ||x +ū ⊥ ,z,λ), where
and, by Lemma 3(ii), any limit point (x,ū ⊥ ,z,λ) is a fixed point of T2 • T1 and satisfiesū ⊥ = 0. By Lemma 7, T1 is restricted nonexpansive and the inequality in Lemma 7(ii) holds with respect to the consensus subspace whereū ⊥ = 0, and T2 ∈ A(
). Thus operators T1 and T2 satisfy restricted average properties as in Lemma 6 in [26] . Then, using an argument as in the proof of Theorem 25.8 in [28] for averaged operators (see proof of Theorem 2 in [26] ), it follows that any sequence
⊥ ,z,λ) a fixed-point of T2 • T1, which by Lemma 3(ii), satisfiesx = x * ,ū ⊥ = 0,λ = 1N⊗λ * , where x * is the variational GNE and λ * the corresponding multiplier. By Lemma 2, any {x k , u k , z k , λ k } generated by Algorithm 1 or (4) converges, and, by (7), its limit is (x * , 1N ⊗ σ(x * ),z, 1N ⊗ λ * ), hence {x k } converges to x * , the variational GNE. Remark 4: The result in Theorem 1 provides conditions for fully distributed convergence of the GNE seeking algorithm on a single time-scale. We note that this is more challenging to establish than in a semi-decentralized setting where the true aggregate is provided by a coordinator. In a distributed setting, when each agent updates action and estimates the aggregate simultaneously, effectively each has to track the changing aggregate (which depends on the other agents' changing actions) while also updating its own action. This means the algorithm operates on an augmented space of decisions and aggregate estimates. This feedback coupling introduces major difficulties, one of them being the lack of guaranteed monotonicity when extending the operators to an augmented space of decisions and aggregate estimates. By using a two time-scale operation (either via diminishing step-sizes, [20] ), or by multiple communication rounds before action update, [21] , [22] ) this issue is circumvented and the analysis is simplified to only the aggregate consensus subspace where (strong) monotonicity holds. However, typically two time-scale operation means slow convergence. Herein, we achieve distributed convergence on a single time-scale by using operator-splitting techniques and balancing the lack of monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient off the consensus subspace by monotonicity properties of the Laplacian.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section we consider a Nash-Cournot game over a network, as in [32] in which each agent performs ν communication rounds to update the local multiplier, then updates its action, followed by another ν communication rounds to update its aggregate estimate. The algorithm in [22] converges to an -GNE, which approaches the variational GNE if ν goes to infinity. For simulation we chose ν = 140, which means that there are 280 communication rounds before an action update, unlike Algorithm 1 where only 2 communication rounds are needed per each action update. The agents' production plots are shown in Figure 2 indicating that the algorithm converges slowly to an -GNE that is quite far from the true Nash. Figure  3 shows plots of the normalized error, x − x * / x * 100% of agents' actions from the variational GNE for the two algorithms, indicating better convergence properties of Algorithm 1. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a distributed algorithm that converges to a variational GNE for aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. The algorithm employs simultaneous action and aggregate estimate update, based on local communication, and uses fixed step-sizes. We proved its convergence by a forward-backward operator-splitting method for two preconditioned operators. We specifically exploited the invariance of the estimate average to show that the operators are restricted monotone. Among future work directions we can mention extension to time-varying and/or directed communication graphs.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1:
(i) Note that from (4), using 1N ⊗In | Lu = 0 T , it follows that 1N ⊗In | u k+1 = 1N ⊗In | u k − 1N ⊗In | x k + 1N ⊗In | x k+1 , for all k ≥ 0. Since u0 = x0, the first claim follows by induction, and the second one follows by using σ(u k ) =
(ii) Let (x, u, z, λ) be a limit point of Algorithm 1 or (4). Then, z = z + υL λ λ, i.e., L λ λ = 0 which, by Assumption 3 implies that λi = λ * for all i ∈ N , for some λ * ∈ R m . From the update for u k in (4) if follows that u = u − κLuu + (u − u), i.e., Luu = 0 which by Assumption 3 implies that ui = u for all i ∈ N , for some u ∈ R n , hence σ(u) = u. Using part (i) it follows that u = σ(x), i.e., in steady-state all agents have the same estimate equal to the action aggregate value. From the update of x k in (4) [28] ), which gives the second KKT condition, (3). Therefore, x = x * is a variational GNE and λ * its multiplier.
